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CASE COMMENTS
LIFE INSURANCE: EXPRESS DISCLAIMER CLAUSE NECESSARY
TO DENY BENEFITS TO ESTATE OF AN INSURED KILLED
WHILE COMMITTING A FELONY
Valley Forge Life Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 196 So. 2d 759 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967)
The insured was killed while attempting an armed robbery. His life
insurance policy contained no express provision to relieve the insurer from
liability should death occur while the insured was acting in violation of law.
Suit was brought to recover the full value of the policy by the insured's
administratrix. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal, recognizing this as a case of first impression HELD,
in the absence of an express violation-of-law clause and without proof that
the policy was purchased in contemplation of the crime, public policy does
not prohibit recovery by the estate of the insured upon a life insurance
contract matured by death sustained while committing a felony.'
Most life insurance contracts today provide that the insurer will not be
liable if the insured is legally executed or killed while committing a felony. 2
When such contingencies are specifically excepted, they are legally enforceable
conditions of the contract. 3 In the absence of these exceptions, however, a
majority of jurisdictions have allowed recovery where the policy is not obtained in contemplation of the crime. 4 A minority of states deny recovery
on policies that lack express violation-of-law clauses. Two related reasons
usually are given: (1) to permit recovery would enable the insured to benefit
from his own wrong and thus would encourage him to violate the law; 5 (2)
death incurred while the insured is acting in violation of the law is not a
risk covered by the policy, even though not specifically excluded. 6
The reasoning of the minority position, however, contains obvious logical
inconsistencies. It is highly unlikely that one who is driven to criminal activity by financial misfortune or mental imbalance would be significantly
deterred by the risk of forfeiting his life insurance7 Moreover, it is absurd
to maintain that one who has been killed while committing a felony can
benefit in any sense of the word. The only persons who possibly could
benefit are the innocent beneficiaries of the policy. Permitting them. to
1. 196 So. 2d at 760.
2. 6 R. CooLE Y, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 5201 (2d ed. 1928).
3. E.g., Redman v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 187 S.W.2d 842 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945);
Guy v. Grange Lodge, Colored Knights of Pythias, 46 S.W.2d 1057 (rex. Civ. App. 1932);
Van Riper v. Constitutional Gov't League, I Wash. 2d 635, 96 P.2d 588 (1939).
4. IA J. A. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §511, at 267 (rev. ed. 1965).
5. See Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550 (1876); Wells v. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 A. 126 (1899).
6. Piotrowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 172, 252 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
7. E.g., Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 I1. 37, 83 N.E. 542 (1907); Weeks
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 122 S.E. 586 (1924); Fields v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249 S.W. 798 (1923).
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recover would not only protect the insured's creditors but also would prevent
his dependents from becoming public charges.8
The minority position, that death incurred while acting in violation of
the law is not a risk covered by a policy of life insurance, even though not
specifically excepted, is also unsound. There is an overriding public policy
that requires the insurer to stipulate expressly those contingencies he wishes
to except. Since such express exceptions are in common use today, it seems
only reasonable to demand that an insurer, who wishes to exclude liability
for death incurred in the commission of a felony, insert a provision to that
effect in the policy. 9 The minority jurisdictions maintain, however, that death
incurred while acting in violation of the law is not an insurable risk primarily
because there is an implied obligation, as in fire insurance policies, to do
nothing wrongfully to accelerate the maturity of the policy.10 Yet it is unreasonable to assume that a person would purposely take part in unlawful
pursuits for the sole intention of maturing his insurance policy." Man's
instinct is to avoid situations involving probability of serious injury or death.12
Moreover, there is a distinction between life and fire insurance. Life insurance is not a contract to indemnify against the possibility of some future
occurrence; it is a contract to remit a specified amount upon the happening
of an inevitable event.13 If proper care is taken, a fire may never occur, but
no amount of care will prevent death. The minority jurisdictions further
assert that such risks should not be covered by the policy, expressly or impliedly, since life tables used to determine premiums do not comprehend
mortality by violation of law. This is an erroneous contention, however.
an exMortality tables are computed on the basis of groups of persons over
14
die.
they
which
in
manner
the
of
regardless
time,
of
tended period
It is curious that even though a well-defined conflict in authority exists
with regard to recovery where there is no specific excepting clause, all jurisdictions seem to accept without question the validity of policies disclaiming
liability for death incurred while in the perpetration of a felony. Those
policy arguments in favor of recovery where liability is not expressly dis8. Some jurisdictions allow recovery to beneficiaries where there is no specific clause
excepting liability, but disallow payment to the insured's estate. The beneficiary is said
to have a vested right, defeasible only by the insured's redesignation of another person, to
the proceeds of the policy. Payne v. Louisiana Indus. Life Ins. Co., 33 So. 2d 444, 445 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1948). The estate, on the other hand, represents the property of the
offender himself; thus payment to that estate is said to be analogous to rewarding the
insured for felonious activity. Udisky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 264 App. Div. 890, 35
N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1942). It is, of course, illogical to allow a named beneficiary to recover, but
to deny recovery to those who share in the estate by other vested rights. The instant
decision rejected this unsound dichotomy.
9. See Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
10. See Campbell v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs, 66 N.J.L. 274, 49
A. 550 (Ct. Err. & App. 1901).
11. See Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 493, 53 P.2d 562, 564 (1936).
12. "'In life policies, the insurer has a guaranty against increasing the risk insured by
that love of life which nature has implanted in every creature.'" McDonald v. Order of
Triple Alliance, 57 Mo. App. 87, 90 (1894).
13. 9 Wis. L. REv. 428 (1934).
14. Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 468, 249 S.W. 798, 799 (1923).
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claimed might be asserted just as emphatically to challenge the validity of
such disclaimers when they are specifically provided for. For example, to
disallow recovery is unconscionable and against public policy because creditor
interests are often left unsatisfied, and dependents of the insured might well
become public charges. If insurance companies are allowed to disclaim such
liability by the use of excepting clauses, the same unconscionable result will
follow. "Is there any reason why one cause of death of a father should deprive the widow and children of the benefit of his life insurance and all other
causes of death, including drugs and vices, should permit them to benefit?
The economic loss to them is the same whether he dies of electrocution at
the hands of the state or of vice or disease.'
An interesting constitutional problem arises in relation to insurance clauses
that specifically disclaim liability due to criminal acts. Although insurance
7
6
companies are guaranteed freedom of contract, both on the state' and federal
levels, such freedom to disclaim liability would seem to be tempered by
statutory and constitutional proscriptions against forfeiture of estate. A vast
majority of states have taken the position that conviction for a felony shall
work neither corruption of blood nor forfeiture of estate upon the one convicted or his heirs.' s In these states, real and personal property descends unobstructed to the heirs of convicted and executed felons. Since an insurance
policy is, in fact, a type of property, 19 denial of that property to the insured's
estate or to his designated beneficiaries constitutes judicial enforcement of
privately legislated forfeiture. As such, liability disclaimers of this type stand
diametrically opposed to the first and highest declaration of public policy.
Some decisions have been influenced by the existence of an "incontestability clause" in policies. Such clauses guarantee that the insurer will not
contest the validity of the policy, after it has been in effect for one or two
years, 20 for any reason except, for example, fraud or nonpayment of premiums. 2 ' The instant case has diminished the importance of this kind of
guarantee even though the Florida Supreme Court held in 1988 that a beneficiary could recover only because the "incontestability" clause precluded
the insurer from questioning payment when the insured died by legal execution.2 2 The clear emphasis in the Lawrence rationale properly is on the
15. Id. at 475, 249 S.W. at 801.
16. Most state constitutions provide for freedom of contract. E.g., FLA. CONST. DCcl.
of Rights §17.
17. U.S. CONsr.art. 1, §10.
18. 18 C.J.S. Convicts §5 (1939). Florida has been governed by five constitutions.
Forfeiture of estate as a result of conviction was forbidden in the 1838, 1861, and 1865
constitutions under the Declaration of Rights §17. This provision was deleted in the
1868 and 1885 constitutions as to convictions in general, but was made applicable to treason
under §23 of the Declaration of Rights. The proposed constitutional revisions of 1967
make provisions for the old §17, thereby again expressly forbidding forfeiture for conviction.
19. Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 471, 249 S.W. 798, 800 (1923).
20. United Order of the Golden Cross v. Overton, 203 Ala. 335, 83 So. 59 (1919) (two
years); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ga. 393, 110 S.E. 178 (1921) (one year).
21. United Order of the Golden Cross v. Overton, 203 Ala. 335, 83 So. 59 (1919).
22. Afro-American Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 113 Fla. 158, 151 So. 405 (1933).
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"violation of law" clause. If the court will not imply the existence of the
latter provision for the insurer's benefit, then logically the court should not
imply nonliability by the absence of the former clause.
In light of the policy arguments of other majority jurisdictions, the present
decision probably will control cases involving death by suicide. In Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,23 the United States Supreme
Court held that public policy of each state may determine whether the
beneficiary of a suicide victim can claim life insurance benefits.2 4 Florida has
never addressed itself to this particular question. Some courts have drawn a
distinction between an insured who is insane and one who is sane; recovery
is permitted in the first instance25 but not the second.26 These courts assert
that suicide by a sane man may be prima facie evidence of deliberate intent
to accelerate the maturity of the policy, whereas self-destruction caused by insanity is like death by natural causes. This dichotomy, however, plunges the
court into difficult considerations of the insured's intent. The instant decision
would shift the focus from an after-the-fact psychological inquiry to the more
objective realm of draftsmanship. The burden would then be upon the
insurer to provide specifically in the policy against payment for suicide.
Whether the case hinges on homicide or suicide, the present ruling has
brought a more sensible approach to this area of the law, at least superficially. The insurer does business with advice of competent legal counsel.
Exceptions that are written into insurance policies are challenge enough to
the uncounseled purchaser, without calling upon the general sweep of public
policy to extricate an insurer who has not expressly provided in the policy
for his own protection.
In a broader perspective, it is unlikely that this decision will further the
protection of innocent dependents and creditors of the deceased. The realistic effect of this case may be simply to guarantee that insurance companies
henceforth will be careful to insert violation-of-law clauses in their policies
as a matter of course. With this result, all of the undesirable side effects
will continue to plague the hapless beneficiaries and creditors, who should
be the first objects of protection by reason of public policy. In a society where
insurance is one of the great stanchions of family and business security, the
courts have a duty to assure that it fulfills that purpose. Though an insurer
may be harmed due to an inadequately drafted contract it is more important
that the insured can be confident that his financial obligations will be protected, without fear that his expectations may be defeated by a public policy
that is in no way reflected in his insurance contract.
JOHN PATRICK KUDER
R. ANTHONY ROGERS

23.
24.
25.
26.

254 U.S. 96 (1920).
Id. at 100.
Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 (1898).
Christensen v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 807, 30 S.E.2d 471 (1944).
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